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BANKRUPTCY: SUPREME COURT
RESTRICTS NEW VALUE
EXCEPTION

The real estate collapse of the late
1980s resulted in a huge number of
bankruptcy filings, as property
owners sought to salvage some val
ue from properties unable to sup
port their mortgages. Inmany of the
battles between borrower and
lender, the borrower's crucial lever
was the threat of a "cramdown" plan
in bankruptcy. In a new decision,
the Supreme Court has made it
clear that cramdown will be a far
less potent threat in the next reces
sion.
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Bankruptcy Code, a plan may be
found to be fair and equitable only
if the holder of any claim or inter

ty under the plan on account of
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such junior claim or interest. In
other words, partners in a debtor
partnership cannot "receive or
retain" anything on account of their
partnership interests if a dissenting
class of creditors has not been paid
in full.
Debtors have avoided the stric
tures of the absolute priority rule
by invoking the "new value excep
tion." That is, a cramdown plan (i.e.,
ing class of creditors) will provide

In Bank of America v. 203 N. LaSalle
Street Partnership, Justice Souter
drafted a m ajority opinion severe
ly limiting the use of the "new val
ue exception" to the absolute
priority rule. This rule says that a
plan can be confirmed if all class
es of creditors consent to the plan,
but if at least one class does not
approve of the plan (as is typical
ly the case where there is a large
undersecured mortgagee), the plan
can only be approved if the bank
ruptcy court holds that it is "fair and
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LaSalle Street's Bankruptcy Plan
The 203 North LaSalle Street Part
nership owed Bank of America $93
million on a mortgage secured by
its interests in an office building.
The bankruptcy court valued the
collateral at $54.5 million, leaving
Bank of America with a $38.5 mil
lion unsecured claim. Under the
partnership's proposed bankrupt
cy plan, the bank would have
received its $54.5 million secured
claim, with interest, over a 7 to 10
year period. However, it would
have received payments with an
estimated present value of just 16%
of its unsecured claim. Other unse
cured claims, which totaled just
$90,000, were to be paid in full.
Finally, partners in the debtor part
nership would retain the equity
interests in exchange for investment
of $6,125 million over the course
of five years.
Bank of America objected that
the partners were receiving prop
erty on account of their junior inter
ests even though its unsecured
claim was not being paid in full,
and thus the absolute priority rule
was violated. The bankruptcy court
rejected this argument, however,
holding that the plan was valid
under the new value exception. A
divided panel of the Seventh Cir
cuit affirmed, putting it in a league
with the Ninth Circuit, which had
approved the new value exception
in 1994. On the other side were
decisions from the Second and
Fourth Circuits that had restricted
the use of the new value excep
tion. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the split in the
Circuits.
Justice Souter, writing for six
Justices, found it unnecessary to
decide whether or not the new val
ue exception exists, ruling that
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LaSalle's plan failed to satisfy the
requirements of the Code regard
less of whether or not new value
plans were permissible. The opin
ion considers three possible mean
ings of the phrase "on account of."
LaSalle argued that the prohibition
against receiving anything "on
account of such junior claims or
interests" meant that the partners
could not receive anything "in
exchange for" their equity interests.
Here, LaSalle argued, the partners
were receiving new equity interests
in exchange for their new capital
contributions, not in exchange for
their old equity interests.
The Court rejected the attempt
to equate "on account of" with "in
exchange for", reasoning that this
was inconsistent with the phrase
"receive or retain", since it would
be "exceedingly odd" to speak of
"retaining" an interest "in exchange
for" that very interest. Moreover,
this construction would render the
absolute priority rule too manipulable, since equity holders could
then retain an interest whenever
substantial funds were paid in
exchange. Determinations of
whether the new value were ade
quate would be "measurjed]] by the
Lord Chancellor's foot, and an
absolute priority rule so variable
would not be much of an absolute."
Having rejected this reading of
"on account of", the Court held that
it must mean "because of." Thus,
the question becomes whether any
degree of causation should be
enough to block confirmation of
the plan, a conclusion that would
mean that old equity holders "sim
ply cannot take property under a
plan if creditors are not paid infull."
Alternatively, the court held that
this language could be construed
"to reconcile the two recognized
policies underlying Chapter 11, or
preserving going concerns and
maximizing property available to
satisfy creditors." Under this later
reading, equity could receive or
retain interests if the equity hold

ers paid at least as much as any
one else would be willing to pay.
In the end, the Court found it
unnecessary to decide between
these two alternatives, holding that
the plan failed to satisfy either.
LaSalle's plan was "doomed . . . b y
its provision for vesting equity in
the reorganized business in the
Debtor's partners without extend
ing an opportunity to anyone else
either to compete for that equity or
to propose a competing reorgani
zation plan." The Court held that
the partners' exclusive opportuni
ty to purchase the equity in the reor
ganized debtor is property received
or retained on account of their
junior interests, in violation of the
absolute priority rule. Only if the
price to paid reflected the fullest
possible value would it be possi
ble for the plan to satisfy the new
value exception (assuming itexists)
and, the Court reasoned, there was
no way to know if the partners were
paying the full value unless the
price were tested in the market.
"Whether a market test would
require an opportunity to offer
competing plans or would be sat
isfied by a right to bid for the same
interest sought by old equity, is a
question we do not decide here. It
is enough to say, assuming a n ew
value corollary, that plans provid
ing junior interest holders with
exclusive opportunities free from
competition and without benefit of
market valuation fall within the
prohibition" of the absolute prior
ity rule.

Other Views
Justice Thomas wrote a concur
rence inwhich Justice Scalia joined,
arguing that much of the majority
opinion was unnecessary. "Regard
less of how direct the causal nexus
must be, the prepetition equity
holders here undoubtedly received
at least on form of property—the
exclusive
opportunity—"on
account of" their prepetition inter-

est. . . . That conclusion ... is suf
ficient to resolve this case."
A l one dissent, filed by Justice
Stevens, would have affirmed the
Seventh Circuit's decision.
Observation: This decision is like

ly to result in a dramatic shift in
bargaining leverage between bor
rowers and lenders. The threat of
a bankruptcy filing will not carry
anyway near the same weight s
before once lenders realize that
cramdown is extremely unlikely.
Moreover, by raising the bar on a
cramdown plan, the LaSalle case
may make it easier for lenders to
get relief from the automatic stay
if the borrower does file for bank
ruptcy, by arguing that no reorga
nization is reasonably in prospect.

holds were formed last year, a 1.5%
increase over 1997.

Renter Population Growth
Not only are the number of new
households on the rise, but much
of the increase reflects growth in
the 20 - 29 age group, the ones most
likely to choose apartment living.
About 70% of households under
age 30 are renters, while only 30%
of older households choose this
type of living. It is true, however,
that young householders are more
sensitive to economic conditions
due to lower incomes, lesser sav
ings and reduced credit options.
Consequently, an economic down
town would encourage many in this
age group to return to the parental
home.

APARTMENTS: EQUILIBRIUM IN

Immigrants Favor Rentals

1999

Immigration has been rising by
about 45,000 each year over the
past four years, and this is likely to
continue for another several years.
About half of new immigrants
reside in apartments initially, a
higher percentage than any other
category.

A pr ediction of equilibrium in U.S.
apartment markets through the end
of 1999 is the conclusion of a study
by PaineWebber done in conjunc
tion with Regional Financial Asso
ciates. The study projects new
supply this year of 356,000 units,
somewhat lower than the forecast
ed demand of 409,000 units. This
would mean that the national
vacancy rate will decline from the
8.4% at 1998 year-end to 8.2%.
Overall, the increase in multifamily household demand should be
driven by continued household
growth; an expected increase in the
renter population; and a slight
boost from immigration. Somewhat
offsetting these is likely to be a con
tinuing high level of single-family
affordability, rather than the slight
decline originally projected.

Household Growth
According to the census bureau,
new household growth has reached
its highest level in the past three
years. About 1.5 million new house

New Construction
The pipeline of new units current
ly is expanding, implying increas
ing completions in the second half
of the year. Housing starts in March
for buildings of five or more units
(seasonally adjusted) came in at
325,000 units, an 8% increase over
last year. As noted above,
PaineWebber projects a total of
356,000 new units in the course of
this year.
Observation: About 15% of new

starts are intended for sale as con
dominiums or cooperatives. This
percentage has been in a steady
decline since 1982, when it was at
a high of about 35%.

DEDUCTIONS: FLOOD
RESTORATION COSTS ARE
REPAIRS
The IRS applied general principles
distinguishing losses, repairs and
capital expenditures in a situation
where a property owner incurred
expense in restoring flood dam
aged business property (Ltr. Rul.
199903030). The property in ques
tion was uninsured when damaged
by severe flooding in 1997. The
owner asked IRS ho w to treat out
lays to restore the property to its
pre-flood condition.

Loss Deduction
Code Section 165 permits the
deduction of any loss not com
pensated for by insurance. The
deduction is the difference between
the fair market value of the prop
erty before and after the casualty
(but in no event can the deduction
exceed the property's adjusted
basis in the hands of the taxpay
er). In any event, the casualty loss
does not include repair or restora
tion expenses (although these may
be some indication of the amount
of the loss). For reasons not
explained, the taxpayer in this sit
uation did not decide to claim a
loss.

Repair Deduction
Code Section 162 permits the
deduction of incidental repair costs
that neither materially add to the
value of the property, nor appre
ciably prolong its life, but merely
keep it in ordinary, efficient oper
ating condition. Prior rulings have
permitted taxpayers to deduct
repair costs of property damaged
in a casualty if t he costs otherwise
meet the requirements of Section
162.

Capital Expenditures
However, outlays for capital expen
ditures are not deductible under

